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Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper reviews and assesses our understanding of the notion of “market discipline” in 
corporate governance. It questions the wholesale appeal to this notion in policy discussion, 
which fails to provide an account of the underlying mechanisms in terms of theory and 
empirical analysis. Discipline that is provided by the “market” must be compared to discipline 
that is provided by other institutions, e.g., intermediaries acting as “delegated monitors”. The 
comparative assessment depends on (i) the information technology, (ii) the role of strategic 
interactions, and (iii) the disciplinary mechanism itself. Concerning (i), the question is 
whether the benefits of multiple sources of information exceed the costs. Concerning (ii), 
strategic interactions concern the free-rider problem in acquiring information that benefits all 
financiers, as well as distributive externalities involved in exploiting an information 
advantage to the detriment of other financiers. Concerning (iii), the question is whether 
investors have explicit intervention rights or whether “discipline” results from managerial 
acquiescence. As for the acquisition and aggregation of information in organized markets, 
positive welfare effects arise only if the information is put to productive use, either through 
improvements in real investment and managerial incentives, or through changes in corporate 
control. Necessary conditions for such benefits to arise are fairly restrictive, especially if the 
changes that occur are based on managerial acquiescence rather than the legal intervention 
rights of investors. The expansion of market-based managerial incentives in the nineties had 
little to do with these theoretical accounts. The experience of moral hazard that has 
accompanied this expansion, on the side of gate-keeping institutions as well as corporate 
management, confirms the predictions of theory about the potential for shortfalls in market 
discipline and the agency costs of equity finance through the open market. 
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1. Rhetoric, Semantics, and Reality of “Market Discipline” 
 
 
This paper discusses the rhetoric, the semantics, and the reality of “market discipline” in 
the nineties. “Market Discipline” has been one of the miracle words of the last decade. In 
1998, lack of market discipline was cited as a major source of the Korean crisis. 
Institutional changes designed to strengthen market forces and market discipline were a 
precondition of IMF help. Earlier in the nineties, one could hear that the resumption of 
capital flows to Mexico and other Latin American countries was closely tied to the use of 
market-related financing instruments, direct investments and portfolio investments, which 
were protected by “market discipline” – unlike the bank loans of the seventies, which had 
to be repeatedly renegotiated in the international debt crisis of the eighties. Questions 
about the effectiveness of “market discipline”, say for the protection, following the 
Mexican Revolution of 1911, of direct investments and portfolio investments in the 
eighteen-nineties would typically be dismissed as being politically incorrect.  
 
The notion of “market discipline” also figures prominently in discussions about bank 
failures and banking crises and about the prudential regulation and supervision of banks. 
Based on Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Calomiris (1998, 1999) has called for a system of 
banking regulation which exploits markets (in this case, markets for subordinated debt) 
and the discipline that they impose to provide regulators’ information about where to 
intervene and where not and to provide incentives for bankers to behave well. The 
Calomiris position has not been adopted by the regulatory community, but even so, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) is listing market discipline as the “third 
pillar” of risk control in banking, after capital requirements and the supervisory review 
process. These recommendations are to some extent motivated by the notion that the S&L 
crisis of the eighties in the United States was due to a “lack of market discipline”, as 
deposit insurance eliminated all incentives for depositors to monitor the institutions where 
they were depositing their savings.   
 
References to “market discipline” should be seen as part of a wider debate on corporate 
finance and corporate governance. Elsewhere (Hellwig 2000), I have referred to this 
debate as the “ongoing repertory play ‘banks versus markets’”, with some scepticism as to 
whether this is really the right play to be performing. In previous times, performances of 
this repertory play had enacted the myth that long-term implicit relations of nonfinancial 
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institutions with banks were responsible for the perceived superiority of the German or the 
Japanese economy relative to the U.K. or the U.S. economy as these long-term relations 
enabled the German or Japanese financial systems to mobilize funds for large-scale, long-
term investments (Gerschenkron 1962, Mayer 1988, Hoshi et al. 1990, 1991). In contrast, 
more recent performances have stressed the ability of markets – in a suitable legal and 
political environment – to provide finance to people who are complete outsiders to the 
system, thereby preventing the kind of sclerosis that sets in when routes to the top of the 
social hierarchy are strictly controlled by those who already are at the top (LaPorta et al. 
1997, Rajan and Zingales 2003a, 2003b).  Given the downturn of Japanese banks since the 
early nineties and the spectacular performance of worldwide stock markets in the second 
half of the nineties, ascendance in these debates has moved from the “pro-bank” to the 
“pro-market” exponents. However, the analytical basis for either assessment is unclear 
(see, e.g., the comments of Allen (2003) and Hellwig (2003) on Rajan and Zingales 
(2003b). 
 
In this context, developments since 2000 should make us pause. Discoveries of fraud in 
companies like Enron, Worldcom, etc. raise questions about the reality of “market 
discipline”. Even where there was no wrongdoing, the ready availability of funds in the 
late nineties to any company with a ”dotcom” in its name suggests that, at least at this 
time, markets did not impose much discipline. Cash was generously delivered and 
generously burnt. The subsequent burst of the bubble provides some indication of 
overvaluation. It also seems clear that there has been excessive real investment, e.g., in 
fibre glass transmission facilities in telecommunications. In current performances of the 
repertory play “banks versus markets”, these developments are sometimes treated as 
unfortunate accidents due to the misdeeds of particular persons, soon to be eliminated 
through the enactment of appropriate new rules (Rajan and Zingales 2003b). I am not 
convinced of this assessment. One must be concerned about the possibility that the 
misreporting and fraud, the development of the bubble and its burst, as well as the long 
reluctance that the Administration and Congress in the Unites States have shown against 
corrective measures, may be a reflection of systematic problems which must be 
encompassed by any serious debate on finance and governance. 
 
Any assessment of “market discipline” is impeded by the fact that the meaning of the term 
is unclear. Journalists nowadays use it with reference to day-to-day stock market 
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valuations of firms and the interpretation of these valuations as a measure of corporate 
performance. However, for such market assessments to have a disciplinary effect, there 
must be a mechanism by which share prices feed into managerial incentives. In the 
eighties, the literature on the market for corporate control (e.g., Jensen and Ruback 1983) 
suggested that the takeover mechanism fulfils this role (though day-to-day stock market 
valuations play hardly a role in that context).  The more recent literature on corporate 
governance (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, La Porta et al. 1997, 1998) still lists the legal 
environment facilitating hostile takeovers as one of the preconditions for a well-
functioning “market-oriented” financial system, but given the developments of the 
nineties, emphasis on the takeover mechanism has been replaced by considerations of 
explicit managerial incentives. Perhaps the role of “shareholder value” rhetoric as a focus 
of boardroom conversation and boardroom rivalries should also be considered. How else 
could one explain that “shareholder value” standards have come into prominence even 
where shareholder powers were reduced or at least not increased? 
 
In the context of banking and banking regulation, “market discipline” is used in yet 
another sense. In Calomiris and Kahn (1991) or Diamond and Rajan (2001) – and in the 
various critical assessments of the S&L as well as other financial crises (Calomiris and 
Gorton 1991) – the banker is subjected to discipline by the requirement to repay deposits 
“on demand”. The combination of the “on demand” clause and the sequential-service 
provision in the demand deposit contract provides depositors with an incentive to monitor 
the banker. If they don’t like what they see, they can ask for their money back, with some 
chance that, if matters are really bad, they may be first in line at the bank. Here the 
disciplining mechanism is provided by an explicit contractual arrangement, though no 
market is involved. In Calomiris (1997), in contrast, the proposal is for bankers to have 
relatively short-term subordinated debt outstanding, which is traded in organized markets, 
so the market price of this debt indicates the market’s assessment of the bank’s solvency. 
As for the question of discipline, the premium over the market rate of interest which the 
market requires in order to be willing to hold the bank’s debt is supposed to serve as a 
signal triggering supervisory intervention. In extreme cases, the unwillingness of the 
market to roll over the bank’s  subordinated debt when it comes due would force the bank 
out of business, either because it fails to meet the regulatory requirement of x% 
subordinated debt or because the lack of the money itself creates an outright liquidity 
problem. In this proposal, there is an involvement of the market but, as in the corporate 
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governance context, the disciplinary mechanism is not entirely clear. To a large extent, 
discipline is brought about by regulatory intervention on the basis of market signals rather 
than an intervention by market participants. 
 
These observations suggest that perhaps the eminence of the term “market discipline” is 
based less on the analytical rigour of the concept(s) than on the emotional appeal of any 
reference to the strength of “markets”. The emotional appeal is particularly strong in the 
United States, where “the market” serves as a dream factory second only to Hollywood, 
and where financial institutions as well as the media that thrive on “the market” seem to 
be in a position to determine the rules of public rhetoric.2 Rhetorically, “the market” tends 
to be identified with “the market system”, which makes it difficult to express scepticism 
about the wonders that are to be expected from “market discipline”. For economists, the 
difficulty is particularly great because the notion that markets function well is at the core 
of economic theory, and we all know about the wonders that can be expected if the law of 
supply and demand is allowed to work without extraneous intervention.  
 
However, we should appreciate that discussions of “market discipline” have little to do 
with “the market system” or even the simple notion of a “market” as it is analysed in 
economic theory. Economic theory looks at markets in the abstract, focussing on their 
implications for the allocation of resources, without saying anything – at least in general 
discussions – on the institutions that serve to implement these allocations. To the extent 
that we refer to this issue at all, we talk about a fictitious Walrasian auctioneer who sets 
prices so as to equate supplies and demands. We don’t talk about this person’s 
information, about his incentives, or even his wages – after all, he is just a fiction.  
 
We do tell our students that, in real life, stock markets are the ones which most resemble 
the markets in our models, but we do not go on to make the policy recommendation that 
all markets should be organized like stock markets. When we see automobile markets 
characterized by close relations between producers and dealers, which enable consumers 
to identify a dealer with a certain brand, we do not complain about the lack of anonymity 
and the scope for corruption that are provided by such personalized car provision. Instead 
we see such vertical relations and the use of brand names as devices to handle moral 
                                                 
2 One sometimes wonders to what extent the “Washington consensus”, by which such public discussion feeds 
into policy measures of the United States and of the International Monetary Fund, may not be reflecting the 
particular interests of these institutions; see Stiglitz (2002). 
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hazard in relations between the producer and the distributor and to reduce the impact of 
information asymmetry about quality, solving problems which the Walrasian market 
model has not even addressed. Standard banking theory suggests a similar role for banks 
acting to facilitate economic transactions in the face of problems which, in the theoretical 
models, are hidden underneath the fictitious auctioneer (Hellwig 1998). 
 
Thus, discussions of “market discipline” should be freed from references – explicitly or 
emotionally – to “the market system”. In all of the instances given, “market discipline” is 
presented as a device to affect the behaviour of a corporate manager or a banker so as to 
reduce the agency costs associated with external financing of this person’s operations. 
This has little to do with the law of supply and demand and a lot to do with the 
institutional framework which implements “market allocations”, presumably in a way 
which reduces the impact of moral hazard and asymmetric information to ensure that the 
provision of external finance is reasonably viable.  In terms of the automobile example, 
this is like the question of what combination of brand reputation and warranty provision is 
appropriate or what exclusionary clauses should be stipulated in the dealership contract.  
 
Given the need to descend from the lofty heights of economic-systems rhetoric to the 
nitty-gritty of information and incentive problems, it is a bit disconcerting to see that the 
term “market discipline” covers so many different examples. It is also disconcerting that 
the term is used in a wholesale fashion without much concern for what the alternatives are 
in any one instance. In the following, I will attempt to bring some structure into the 
discussion, on both counts. I will begin with a discussion of what financial “markets” 
actually do and in what sense one can speak of “markets” as performing such functions 
differently from other institutions. In particular, I will discuss the specifics of information 
processing in different institutions and different governance structures. Finally, I will 
return to a discussion of “market discipline” and corporate governance. 
 
II. What Do Financial “Markets” Do? What Do They Do Differently?  
 
At a first glance, the answer to the question of what financial “markets” do is rather 
obvious: They provide finance to households and firms that need extra funds, relying on 
the surpluses of other units of the economy.  In so doing, they have an influence on what 
kinds of expenditures are undertaken, in particular, what investment projects are selected, 
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which in turn is a major determinant of the economy’s return prospects and the economy’s 
risks.  
 
In cases where the investment horizons of final investors fall short of the length of life of 
an investment project, secondary financial “markets” provide liquidity, enabling the initial 
investor to sell when he wants to, even when the project is still going on. In such cases, 
the later returns of the investment project benefit the initial investor not because he is 
around to reap them, but because the prospect of these returns determines the price at 
which he can sell.  
 
On a second look, however, one appreciates that the preceding account characterizes the 
functions of the financial system as a whole rather than anything specific about financial 
“markets”. In a standard account of a bank-dominated financial system, we see banks 
collecting funds from households and firms with surpluses and using these funds to 
provide finance to households and firms that need them, thereby affecting what 
investment projects are selected and what return prospects and risks the economy is 
facing. To the extent that these banks engage in maturity transformation, they also provide 
liquidity, e.g., as the “on demand” clause enables each depositor to reap his returns 
whenever he wants to. At this superficial level then, there is no difference between the 
functions of a system of financial “markets” and the functions of a banking system.  
 
In terms of the mechanics of the system, two major differences between a system based on 
“markets” and a system based on banks jump to the eye: First, on the financing side, 
“market” finance involves multiple financiers and tends to be more anonymous, with less 
of an ongoing relationship and less scope for “cronyism”, than bank finance. Second, in 
terms of the relation between final users and final providers of funds, “market” finance 
tends to involve more direct finance, i.e., claims that are issued by the final user of funds 
and that directly expose the final provider of funds to the specific risks associated with the 
final user. For “market” finance, a paradigmatic example would be the initial public 
offering of common stock of a firm to final investors, for bank finance the use of customer 
deposits to provide bank loans to a firm in the context of an exclusive “main bank” 
relation.  
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However, there are many hybrids: Banks controlling access to the stock market in pre-
1914 Germany and selling their customers the shares of firms with whom they had a main 
bank relation would be an instance of banks using their dominance over the financial 
system to influence an operation that would ordinarily be associated with “market” 
finance. The provision of bank loans to large corporations in Germany in the nineteen-
eighties did not involve organized exchanges, yet it was by all accounts characterized by 
an absence of relationship effects and a high degree of competitiveness (Edwards and 
Fischer 1994). (The same can be said about Switzerland during these years.) The existence 
of such hybrids indicates that one must go beyond a wholesale observation of whether or 
not a financing operation involves organized exchanges and whether or not final providers 
of funds are left to bear specific risks, and instead look at the details of the interactions 
between the different units that are involved, final users of funds, final providers of funds, 
and financial institutions, from banks to stock brokers and analysts. 
 
At this point, the discussion must turn to matters of information, incentives, and 
governance. As is well known, the financing relation is fraught with information and 
incentive problems because, in return for his money, the financier receives no more than a 
piece of paper with an I.O.U., the value of which is hard to assess and is indeed 
endogenous because it depends on the issuer’s behaviour. If the issuer steals the money or 
mismanages it, the financier’s claim is worth nothing; the same is true if the issuer is 
honest, but his undertaking is doomed to fail. For finance to be viable, the parties involved 
must find ways to reduce the impact of the information and incentive problems which 
thereby arise. The task is made difficult by the fact that the mere provision of external 
finance tends to generate moral hazard and adverse selection because (i) the mere 
existence of the financier’s claim is likely to distort the issuer’s incentives against all 
modes of behaviour that benefit the financier at a cost to himself, and (ii) the mere 
availability of finance is likely to attract “entrepreneurs” who know that they don’t have 
much of a chance but may as well try it anyway – at somebody else’s expense.  
 
To deal with these problems, financiers need information and control. Information should 
improve the selection of projects funded; it should also provide a base for monitoring 
whether the financing contract is being adhered to. Most importantly, information 
provides a base for using whatever scope for control the financier has been given. Control 
enables the financier to reduce moral hazard on the side of the borrower; however, control 
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by the financier may be limited by the borrower’s comparative advantage in running the 
venture and by the borrower’s worry about moral hazard in the form of the financier’s 
using his powers of control  to expropriate him.  
 
The use of information and control to support a financing relation depends on the 
provisions of the contract(s) and on the incentives of the different parties as the contract is 
being carried out. Incentives of the different parties depend in important ways on how 
many financiers there are; this is one point where the difference between “market” finance 
and bank finance matters. Two effects seem to be important: First, there is a public-goods 
effect by which the efforts of one financier at gathering information and exerting control 
over the management of the venture that is being funded benefit not just this financier, but 
all the other financiers as well. When there are multiple financiers, this public-goods 
effect gives rise to a free-rider problem because, at least in the absence of counteracting 
devices, each financier will tend to neglect the benefits that his effort brings for the other 
financiers. Relative to the efficient amount, there is then likely to be an undersupply of 
effort for information gathering and exertion of control. The free-rider problem is a major 
focus of discussion in the literature on corporate takeovers as an incentive mechanism 
supporting the viability of stock market finance (Manne 1968, Grossman and Hart 1980). 
 
Second, any one financier’s effort at gathering information and exerting control may 
impose negative externalities on the other financiers, serving redistributive rather than 
allocative purposes. This is the case, e.g., if the information collected by the bank 
depositor in a Calomiris-Kahn type of model and the liquidation induced by his 
withdrawal of funds have no effects on the total funds available to depositors3 and serve 
only to ensure that the informed depositor is the first to run so that he gets his money back 
and the others must do with  whatever assets the bank  has left. A similar redistributive 
externality is at work in models of costly information collection for the purpose of 
speculation in organized markets. Thus, in the standard models of Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) or Verrecchia (1982), with exogenously given asset supplies and asset returns, the 
speculative use of information advantages comes at the expense of other market 
                                                 
3 Calomiris and Kahn (1991) assume that the bank’s liquidation through a run prevents worse outcomes, and 
actually enhances the assets that are available to depositors. However, with multiple depositors, the incentive 
mechanism they describe does not depend on this assumption. Indeed, the redistributive externality described 
here has the interesting implication that the threat of premature liquidation under deposit finance may be credible 
and may therefore provide proper ex ante incentives, even though ex post it is (collectively) inefficient to carry 
this threat out.  
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participants, in particular those who have “real” reasons for wanting to trade and rely on 
secondary markets for liquidity. In the literature on market microstructure, this 
consideration provides one of the many arguments against the admission of insider trading 
(see, e.g., Dennert 1991). 
 
Whereas the free-rider problem suggests that a multiplicity of financiers gives rise to an 
underinvestment in effort for information gathering and control, the redistributive 
externality considered in the preceding paragraph suggests the opposite. To the extent that 
information and control yield individual benefits at the expense of other participants and 
to the extent that effort choices neglect the negative externalities on other participants, 
private incentives for investing effort in information gathering and the exertion of control 
will tend to be excessive.  
 
Having both the free-rider problem as a reason for underinvestment and the redistributive 
externality as a reason for overinvestment in information and control, one is tempted to 
conclude that there must be some number of outside financiers so that the two effects just 
cancel out and one actually gets an efficient level of investment in information and 
control. Efficiency here would have to be understood in a suitable n-th best sense, as 
referring to that level of investment which is called for from an optimal incentive-
contracting perspective ex ante. By this interpretation, the number of financiers would 
have to be determined as part of the overall contract ex ante, with a view to its subsequent 
incentive implications.  
 
The notion that the number of financiers should be determined ex ante with a view to its 
subsequent incentive implications is developed in Calomiris and Kahn (1991). However, 
they are less concerned with the redistributive externality4 than with the possibility that 
the information collected by multiple financiers, each receiving an independent signal, 
may, on aggregate, be better than whatever information a single financier could obtain. 
The very same notion underlies the view that stock market finance involves many people 
collecting information, with information aggregation through market prices providing a 
                                                 
4 Indeed, for the case of multiple depositors, the payoff matrix that they present is incomplete, which makes them 
miss the observation that the withdrawal game generated by their model exhibits the same multiplicity of 
equilibria, including “sunspot” runs equilibria as the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) liquidity provision model of 
deposit finance. 
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better base for decision making than would be available to any one investor.5 An example 
is provided by Allen (1993), who suggests that stock prices based on aggregate 
information provide better guidance for the allocation of investment funds than would be 
available on the basis of individual information. 
 
The view that there are benefits to having multiple sources of information stands in 
marked contrast to the alternative view that information generation involves scale 
economies in that the duplicate generation of the same piece of information is wasteful. 
The Calomiris-Kahn model of deposit finance of banks and the theory of information 
aggregation through asset prices, which underlies the assessment of Allen (1993), are 
based on the assumption that additional pieces of information are not simply duplicating 
the first one, but are providing new signals in the sense that different information sources 
involve stochastically independent errors. We should recall, however, that the duplication-
of-information view of multiple sources of information plays an important role in the 
theory of financial intermediation. Since Diamond (1984), much of the literature on 
financial intermediation has associated banking with the “delegated monitoring” of loan 
clients, the idea being that it suffices for the monitoring costs to be spent once, by one 
monitoring agent, and that duplicate monitoring would involve costs without providing 
more information.  Given this view of duplicate monitoring, much of the literature on 
financial intermediation has been concerned with the agency costs that arise when the task 
of monitoring loan clients is “delegated” to an intermediary who collects funds from 
depositors and uses them to provide loans, while monitoring the loan clients. I will return 
to this question below, when I contrast the role of banks serving as financial 
intermediaries à la Diamond (1984) and the role of stock market institutions (brokers, 
analysts, accountants, investment bankers) providing information to shareholders.  
 
The number of external financiers for a given user of funds also affects the strategic 
interdependence between the contracting parties. One factor may simply be negotiation 
costs and transactions costs. When the number of financiers is large, such costs may 
eliminate any scope for renegotiating the initial contract. Whereas in the international debt 
crisis of the eighties, the sovereign debts that had been incurred in the late seventies were 
renegotiated throughout the eighties with a consortium of a few hundred banks, in the 
international debt crisis of the thirties, the various sovereign bond issues of previous 
                                                 
5 On information aggregation through market prices, see Grossman (1976), Hellwig (1980), Kyle (1989); on the 
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decades were not renegotiated and simply went into default.6 From a theoretical 
perspective, inability to renegotiate has advantages and disadvantages: The advantage is 
that threats of bankruptcy are more credible – and can have beneficial incentive effects – 
even renegotiation ex post is infeasible.7 This is presumably a reason why adherents of 
“market discipline” extol the toughness by which markets – or rather the financiers with 
market instruments – avoid being drawn into cozy renegotiations with errant debtors. 
However the disadvantage is that, in the absence of subsequent renegotiations, it is 
impossible to adapt the contractual relation to changing circumstances, e.g., changes in 
international currency exchange rates, oil prices, and the like. Which of the two effects 
dominates depends on circumstances. However, it is interesting to note that the 
international loan renegotiations of the eighties did end up providing the international 
banks with substantial returns.8 
 
Given these abstract theoretical considerations, I return to the question of what it is that 
financial “markets” do. The two simple characteristics that were mentioned above – 
namely a multiplicity of financiers and a prevalence of direct, rather than intermediated, 
finance – lend themselves to the view that market finance involves a regime where 
multiple investors fund a firm and collect information about a firm, and incentives for 
such information collection are provided by the fact that, through direct finance, they have 
a direct involvement. This view of market finance contrasts with a view of bank finance 
where a financial intermediary collects funds from final investors and, on his own 
account, invests these funds in various firms, each of which it monitors. The intermediary 
saves on information costs and is able to renegotiate contracts – indeed he is unable to 
commit not to renegotiate contracts.  
 
These different views of market finance and bank finance involve different assumptions 
about information technologies. In one approach it is advantageous to have multiple 
sources of information; in the other this would be wasteful. Given the differences in 
assumptions, it seems fatuous to search for an unambiguous assessment as to which 
                                                                                                                                                        
usefulness of such information, see Allen (1993), Holmström and Tirole (1993). 
6 On the distinction between the debt crises of the thirties and the eighties, see Eichengreen and Portes (1986).  
7 In Diamond and Rajan (2001), this is the advantage of having multiple depositors providing finance to a bank. 
8 On rates of return to international lending from the seventies to the nineties, see Klingen, Weder, Zettelmeyer 
(2002). 
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arrangement is likely to do better in the real world. This must depend on circumstances 
favouring one set of conditions or the other.  
 
III. Information Processing and “Discipline” under Market Finance 
 
Leaving the general comparative discussion, I now turn to the details of information 
collection, information aggregation, and incentive provision under market finance. The 
notion that prices aggregate information has been formalized by Grossman (1976). In his 
analysis, there are n agents, each of whom receives a signal about a firm’s returns. On the 
basis of his information, he buys or sells shares in the market. As the market price reflects 
the different traders’ choices, so it will reflect their information, going up if on aggregate 
they want to acquire the stock and going down if on aggregate they want to divest it. In 
Grossman’s model, remarkably, the price acts as a statistically efficient aggregator, i.e., 
once one knows the price, one knows as much about the stock return as if one knew the 
entire vector of individual signals.  
 
This latter result is probably no more than a curiosum. Hellwig (1980) shows that the 
statistical efficiency of the aggregation of information through prices disappears once 
there is some “noise” in the market, i.e., a dependence of equilibrium prices on unknown 
variables other than the participants’ information signals. Moreover, endogenizing 
people’s decisions to acquire information or not, Verrecchia (1982), following Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980) for the case of homogeneous information, has shown that, if the cost of 
acquiring information is positive, then the statistical properties of equilibrium prices are 
bounded away from efficiency, even if the level of “noise” in the market is small. If there 
is little “noise”, there will just be very few people acquiring information, so that the 
effects of the information and of the “noise” on the equilibrium price will still be 
commensurate with each other, and the “noise” will be strong enough to contaminate the 
statistical properties of the relation between prices and information. The resulting 
equilibrium prices provide a noisy signal of aggregate information. This signal is useful to 
every individual in the market, but does not supersede the information that any one 
individual has on his own. The equilibrium informativeness of asset prices will depend on 
private incentives for information acquisition; it becomes larger if the costs of information 
acquisition decrease, e.g., because of a government subsidy.  
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Suppose we append a real investment story to the Grossman-Hellwig-Verrecchia model. 
For instance, suppose that the equilibrium real investment of the firm in question is given 
by an increasing function of its share price. Such a relation can easily be derived from a 
Tobin-q type of model based on the supply function of the investment goods industry. 
Then we find that positive information about the firm’s prospects induces informed 
traders to buy the firm’s shares; this generates a price increase. This price increase in turn 
motivates the firm to issue more shares and to buy additional investment goods. 
Alternatively, if information is negative, the firm is induced to reduce its real investment.  
 
In this account, it is beneficial to have the information in question. By inducing the firm to 
have more real investment when the information about return prospects is good and the 
share price is high, and to have less real investment when the information about return 
prospects is bad, the system enables the economy to better adapt the allocation of scarce 
investment resources to the actual prospects that the different firms have. This enhances 
the efficiency of the use of these resources. Allen’s (1993) view of the benefits of stock 
market finance for resource allocation is essentially based on this story.  
 
Within the model, information acquisition choices are not actually efficient. If the 
response of the firm’s real investment to the stock price is highly elastic, information 
acquisition is inefficiently low, and a subsidy to information acquisition, financed by a 
lump sum tax would raise aggregate surplus. There is a kind of free-rider problem in that 
each agent deciding upon the acquisition of information neglects the benefits he conveys 
to others when the impact of his portfolio choice on the stock price communicates some of 
his information to the rest of the economy, enabling them to adjust their portfolio 
positions as well and, most importantly, inducing the firm to adapt its real investment to 
the information.  
 
In contrast, if the response of the firm’s real investment to the stock price is highly 
inelastic, information acquisition is inefficiently high, and a tax on information acquisition 
used to provide everybody with a lump sum subsidy would raise aggregate surplus. In this 
case, the firm’s real investment hardly reacts to the information at all. There is however, a 
redistributive effect by which “liquidity traders”, e.g., those people who want to liquidate 
stock for extraneous reasons that have nothing to do with the information, get less 
favourable terms from the market. The idea is that somebody has to make up for the costs 
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of the information acquisition of informed traders.  “Uninformed” conscious speculators 
will not do so because they appreciate the problem and can protect themselves, e.g., 
through the use of passive portfolio strategies. “Liquidity traders” are the only alternative. 
They suffer the redistributive externality, which is at work when information acquisition 
takes place, even though there is no or hardly any social benefit to be reaped from the 
information. 
 
The proposition that information acquisition and the presence of people with private 
information harms those people who want to use the market for “real” purposes is very 
robust to changes in the institutional setting. This proposition identifies a key problem in 
the analysis of market microstructure. For example, if we consider a system based on 
market makers announcing buying and selling prices, the market makers must be afraid of 
having their offers taken up by an informed trader who causes the market maker to sell 
when the information is good and to buy when the information is bad. To reduce the 
impact of this problem, the market makers have a spread between buying and selling 
prices. The spread is higher, the more they are afraid of informed speculators; for 
infrequently traded stocks, e.g., in London, spreads on the order of 30% would not be 
unheard of. The spreads hurt liquidity traders, e.g., the people who want to sell in order to 
buy a house. As a seller, the liquidity trader receives a lower price; as a buyer, he pays a 
higher price than he would if market makers were sure that he was not acting on private 
information.  
 
Informed speculation is thus a major problem for the viability of secondary financial 
markets. In some of the literature on insider trading, this observation is used to argue the 
extreme proposition that any securities trade on the basis of private information should be 
banned as insider trading. This extreme position underlies, e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
position in the sixties, as well as the prosecution’s stance (and some dissenting votes) in 
the cases of Chiarella and Dirks in the seventies and eighties. In these latter cases and 
others in the eighties, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the ban on insider trading 
more narrowly, asking that there be some violation of fiduciary duty as well as a use of an 
information advantage (Dennert 1991). However, the notion that a ban on insider trading 
is a suitable measure to protect market functioning (as opposed to protecting fiduciary 
relationships) is based on the harm done by informed speculation to liquidity traders as 
they try to rely on the market.  
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In the model sketched above, these considerations of the harm that informed trading does 
to the functioning of secondary markets must be traded off against the social benefits of 
having real investment depend on the information. As discussed above, the comparison 
hinges upon whether real investment depends strongly or not so strongly on the 
information. Only if real investment choices are strongly affected by the information 
contained in stock prices will the social benefits outweigh the costs of having the 
functioning of markets disturbed. Allen’s (1993) view, which was reported above, seems 
to presume that this is indeed the case. 
 
Turning from the discussion of models to an assessment of such matters in reality, we 
need to ask how strongly the behaviour of the corporation depends on the price of its 
stock. In particular, how strong is the improvement-of-financing effect of the previous 
discussion in reality? What can be said about additional real effects of movements in stock 
prices?  
 
Empirically, there is little doubt that asset prices do contain useful information. A 
particularly striking example is given by Roll’s (1984) analysis of the futures market for 
frozen orange concentrates. According to Roll’s findings, the prices for these contracts 
incorporated all the information that was contained in the forecasts of the U.S. weather 
service – and some additional information on top of that; the U.S. weather service could 
have improved the quality of its forecasts if it had taken account of the information 
contained in those prices. Similarly, Flannery’s (1998) review of the empirical literature 
on information contained in bank share prices supports the policy recommendation that 
bank supervisors should try to exploit this information, using market assessments to 
shorten the lag before they intervene when an institution is in trouble.     
 
Even so, I am highly sceptical about the practical relevance of the improvement-of-
financing effect. The reason is not so much that some of the stock market finance we have 
seen in the late nineties has been misdirected. Rather, I am not convinced that the 
financing role of stock markets is anywhere commensurate with the overall activity in 
stocks that we observe. My scepticism is based on the observation that, in terms of net 
flows, in most economies, equity finance through new stock issues plays a relatively 
minor role (Mayer 1988, Hackethal and Schmidt 1998); and, moreover, for most firms, 
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equity finance through new stock issues tends to be a once-in-a-lifetime event (Rajan and 
Zingales 1998). At the time when this event occurs, it may be of crucial importance, but 
this is quite a different story.  
 
The strategies of repurchasing equity and simultaneously issuing new shares, which were 
pursued by American companies in the nineties, may lend more weight to the 
improvement-of-financing effect. Here, however, I would like to have a more precise 
account of how exactly the effect works for  such strategies.  
 
Given this scepticism about the improvement-of-finance effect, I turn to incentive 
provision as the second main candidate for explaining social benefits of stock prices 
containing information. Here I see three possible channels, outright incentive schemes, 
takeover threats, and boardroom rivalry. Outright incentive schemes involve stocks, stock 
options, and other devices that make managerial pay depend directly on the stock price. 
Up to 1990, such schemes played a surprisingly little role (Jensen and Murphy 1990); 
since then, they have become very prominent in some European countries as well as the 
United States. Incentive effects of takeover threats and boardroom rivalry depend on the 
possibility that a low share price may attract a potential raider or motivate a boardroom 
rival to stage a palace revolution. Either possibility may provide strong incentives to 
managers to prevent the stock price from falling.  
 
Behind the notion that market discipline has beneficial incentive effects, there is the idea 
that, in the absence of better information about managerial performance, reliance on the 
stock price can be useful because in any incentive problem it is always better to use 
additional information if one has it (Holmström 1979). On the basis of this idea, 
Holmström and Tirole (1993) have actually devised a model in which incentive schemes 
based on stock prices are useful – in spite of the existence of other sources of (partial) 
information about the company and in spite of the need to worry about speculators’ 
incentives for information acquisition and the impact of informed speculation on the 
functioning of secondary markets.  
 
However, there are two caveats. First, optimal incentive contracting makes incentive pay 
depend on those aspects of stock price movements that fall under the control of the 
managers in question. To the extent that a firm’s prospects are determined by overall 
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macroeconomic conditions and to the extent that the firm’s share prices are driven by 
overall market movements, which have nothing to do with managerial behaviour, there is 
no reason to make managerial pay dependent on these price movements. Rewards that are 
paid when the overall market is going up have little to do with incentive provision. As 
discussed by Bebchuk and Fried (2004), outright incentive schemes that were 
implemented in the nineties did not make these distinctions and therefore had little to do 
with optimal incentive contracting.  
 
Second, the theoretical models that have been studied have looked at effort as a single 
variable. In practice, managerial effort has many dimensions, e.g., effort to improve the 
firm’s performance today and effort to improve the firm’s prospects for the future. From 
the theory of multidimensional incentive provision (e.g., Holmström and Milgrom 1991), 
we know that in such situations, one must worry about the distribution of effort across the 
different dimensions. In particular, there is a danger that strong incentives in one 
dimension may induce an undersupply of effort in another dimension. This danger is 
particularly strong if the results of taking effort in one dimension can be measured 
relatively precisely and, in the other dimension, their measurement is subject to great 
uncertainty. In this case, the implementation of the optimal unidimensional incentive 
scheme for the first dimension leads to precisely the crowding out of effort in the second 
dimension that is to be feared (Holmström and Tirole 1993). 
 
The stock price is a measure of the firm’s overall return prospects, more precisely, of the 
risk-adjusted expected present value of returns. As such it depends on current returns as a 
signal of overall prospects, as well as any additional information about what the firm’s 
future prospects might be. In terms of the preceding discussion, one may therefore ask 
whether orienting managerial incentives on stock prices gives appropriate weights to 
different effort dimensions for performance today and for future prospects. If we think 
about cost cutting as a major element of managerial activity, we may ask whether outside 
investors would really be in a position to assess the relation between current cost savings 
and the associated diminution in output quantity or quality, especially if the latter 
concerns the future. Could it be that stock prices and shareholder value give too large a 
weight to the relatively hard information about current costs, relative to the relatively soft 
information about future prospects, thereby distorting incentives and inducing  excessive 
cost cutting? Discussions about stock-based incentive schemes as well as shareholder 
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value have perhaps paid too little attention to the problem of effort allocation when effort 
is multidimensional.  
 
To conclude this discussion of information acquisition, information processing and 
“market discipline”, I note that none of the mechanisms effective today involve outright 
“discipline” in such that market participants get explicit powers to exert control. Incentive 
schemes are mutually agreed upon, and, moreover, they have little to do with control. 
They are introduced by corporate boards, usually at the initiative of incumbent managers; 
this is reflected in the observation that many of these schemes appear more as mechanisms 
for enrichment than as optimal contracting devices (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Hostile 
takeovers have, by and large, ceased to be serious threats: The installation of anti-takeover 
defences in the years after 1989 has ensured that a takeover without managerial consent is 
hardly possible (Roe 1994, Useem 1993); managerial consent therefore is usually bought 
by large severance payments.  
 
Finally, it will be easy for corporate executives to abandon the focus on shareholder value 
rhetoric in boardroom rivalry if boardroom fashions change once again. Its rise to 
prominence in the nineties poses a paradox, for, interestingly, the very corporate 
executives who have extolled shareholder value since the early nineties have also gone out 
of their way to reduce the scope for shareholder interference in their activities, introducing 
poison pill amendments into their corporate charters and the like (Useem 1993). The 
paradox is perhaps resolved by observing that the rise of shareholder value rhetoric 
coincided with the increase in the use of stock-price-related pay. This explanation, though, 
would be all the more reason for doubting the role of “stock market discipline” as a 
mechanism for control. 
 
To understand this point, it is useful to go back to the Calomiris-Kahn model of deposit 
finance. In that model, control is exerted by each depositor individually as he asks for his 
money back; if enough depositors do this, the borrower goes bankrupt and the 
management of his assets is taken away from him.  In contrast, the mechanisms of 
“market discipline” that are associated to stock price movements have no such immediate 
impact on the incumbent management’s positioning of the firm. As discussed by Rochet 
and Vives (2004), the control mechanism associated with deposit may force inefficient 
liquidations. There seems to be a trade-off between the power of the disciplinary 
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mechanism to really impose discipline and the efficiency of the ensuing resource 
allocation. The trade-off has to do with the greater subtlety of information aggregation, 
through prices rather than the demand deposit mechanism. The former provides more 
precise information without prejudging the ensuing allocation. The latter prejudges the 
ensuing allocation by imposing bankruptcy whenever a sufficient number of depositors 
want their money back. The relation between information aggregation mechanisms, on the 
one hand, and disciplinary intervention modes, on the other hand, would seem to be an 
important matter for future research.  
 
 
 
IV. Market Discipline and Corporate Governance in the Nineties  
 
The nineties, in particular the second half of the nineties, saw a remarkable shift towards 
market finance. Most prominent was of course the burst in outright equity finance that was 
supported by and in turn supporting the stock market boom. Whereas the economic 
expansion of the mid-to-late eighties had largely been funded by debt instruments, bonds 
in the United States and bank loans in Continental Europe, a large part of the expansion of 
the late nineties was financed by new equity, in Conttinental Europe as well as the United 
States.9 Even where loan finance was used, many of the issuing banks used securitization, 
in particular through credit derivatives, to shift the inherent risks from their own books 
into the books of third parties so that, in a certain sense, their role began to look like that 
of brokers or market makers rather than that of intermediaries who put their own money at 
risk.  
 
Expansion of equity finance in the nineties was accompanied by an expansion of stock-
price-related remuneration schemes for corporate executives, as well as an expanded use 
of the term “shareholder value” as the criterion by which to judge corporate managers in 
the financial press as well as in boardroom infighting. At first sight, therefore, it looks as 
though the developments of the nineties should be interpreted as a movement towards 
availing oneself of the benefits of market finance/direct finance and the associated 
incentive effects. Indeed, prior to the burst of the bubble in 2000, many observers 
interpreted the developments of the nineties in precisely these terms, arguing that, at least 
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at this stage of economic development, a system based on market finance is superior (see, 
e.g., Rajan and Zingales 2003a, 2003b). The fact that this system facilitated the rise of 
Internet  and biotech firms provides some substance to the assessment. After all, these are 
the sectors that capture the imagination as obvious carriers of technological progress. 
 
Even the bubble and its fallout can be seen in a positive light. A decade earlier, the 
economic expansion of the late eighties in Continental Europe and Japan had largely been 
financed by bank loans to firms and real-estate investors. In the subsequent downturn, 
when loans turned sour, many banks were hard hit, and, in many countries, there were 
severe banking crises. Banking crises and banking problems in turn impaired the ability of 
these institutions to provide loans for new investments. With an absence of other 
institutions to take their place, there was a pronounced contraction in business investment, 
contributing further to a deepening of the recession. In some of the Scandinavian 
countries, for instance, the recession of the years 1991 – 1994 rivalled the Great 
Depression in severity. In contrast, the fallout from the stock market implosion from 2000 
to 2003 has been comparatively mild. The reason is that, apart from certain life insurance 
and pension institutions with insurance policies and pension plans involving defined 
benefits rather than defined contributions, the financial sector itself has not been much 
hit.10 In contrast to the early nineties, we have not seen a severe banking crisis during 
these years. The fallout from the burst of the bubble has not severely impaired the ability 
of financial systems to fund new investment. To the extent that investment has lagged, this 
has been mainly because of a lack of demand, due to the presence of excess capacity in 
the aftermath of strong expansion in the late nineties.  
 
At this point banking regulators might chime in and suggest that this beneficial 
development is precisely what they would have hoped for and what the various 
improvements in capital adequacy regulation of banks, in particular under the Basel II 
accord, are intended to achieve. Shift risks, in particular securitizable risks, out of the 
banks’ books and into somebody else’s, who presumably is better able to bear these risks, 
and who is perhaps also better able – or has better incentives – to monitor the ventures that 
are being financed. Economists worried about moral hazard in banking and finance would 
tend to agree, arguing that banks themselves are financed by deposits, i.e., debt-like 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 Debt finance did become prominent in the very late stages of the expansion, around the year 2000,  as 
telecommunications firms used bonds to continue financing their investments in network and in UMTS licences. 
10 A caution about telecommunications bonds may be in order here. 
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instruments, and that the use of such instruments gives rise to excessive risk-taking as the 
borrower’s gambles benefit him in the event of success and hurt the lenders in the event of 
failure, when the borrower goes bankrupt.  
 
However, this sanguine view neglects a few observations which seem highly relevant for 
an appropriate descriptive assessment and a normative evaluation of what actually 
happened. In the first place, the fact that we have not had a major financial crisis induced 
by the stock market implosion does not mean that there have been no adverse effects. 
Adverse effects have merely been borne by parties other than banks, in particular by final 
consumers. As holders of stocks and mutual funds certificates or as participants of 
defined-contributions pensions plans, final consumers have been hard hit, with the 
consequence that many people will have to retire later and have to do with lower 
retirement incomes than they could have reckoned on. Insurance and pension institutions 
with contracts involving defined benefits have also been hit; the fact that these 
institutions’ liabilities have long maturities has so far made it possible to smooth over 
many of their difficulties, but even so, there remains an open question for the future.11  At 
the very least, an argument is needed as to why it should preferable for private consumers 
and retirement institutions rather than banks to be bearing the consequences of the 
downturn. 
 
 Second, we need to take account of the fact that the overall development was 
accompanied by significant instances of wrongdoing, such as fraudulent reporting of 
business results or the mishandling of conflicts of interest by accounting firms and 
financial analysts, all of which occurred on a large scale, not just in a few exceptional 
cases. We also need to take account of the fact that the greater reliance on stock-price-
related executive compensation was initiated by corporate management itself and that the 
details of this compensation had little to do with incentive provision in the sense of the 
theoretical models. Corporate managers were rewarded for stock price increases that were 
recognizably due to overall market developments or even macroeconomic developments 
that had nothing to do with their behaviours. Finally, we need to take account of the fact 
that resistance from corporate managers induced the political system in the United States 
                                                 
11 However, for someone recalling the US S&L crisis in the eighties,  the question arises whether the attempt to 
smooth over the effects – on these institutions – of the asset depreciation that has occurred may not give rise to a 
sort of gambling for resurrection that may end up being more detrimental than any effects of an immediate 
acknowledgement of the extent of the difficulties. 
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to refrain from imposing appropriate accounting rules for certain forms of managerial 
compensation such as stock options, so profit reports were per se exaggerated, and there 
was no clear account of the cost of such compensation to the firm. 
 
In the accounts of Rajan and Zingales (2003a, 2003b), the various instances of 
malfunctioning and malfeasance appear as unfortunate mishaps, as does the resistance of 
political systems to correcting them. These mishaps are seen as exceptions which should 
not lead us to question the ascendance of market finance. I disagree with this assessment. 
In my view, the instances of malfunctioning and malfeasance that we have seen exhibit 
some systematic features which, at the very least, raise doubts as to whether the 
ascendance of market finance in the nineties has anything to do with “market discipline”, 
let alone any of the theoretical models supporting the notion of market discipline. 
 
As a first piece of analysis, consider the roles of analysts and accountants. The models of 
information processing through markets that I discussed above have no place for them; 
they are models of independent information gathering by final investors themselves. As 
discussed above, such information gathering by final investors is useful because it exploits 
the benefits of having multiple independent sources of information. In contrast, the analyst 
and the accountant would seem to be somewhat closer to the notion of delegated 
monitoring that is the basis of Diamond’s (1984) theory of financial intermediation. The 
analyst specializes in information acquisition and communicates this information to 
investors. By having multiple investors rely on the information provided by an analyst, the 
system exploits the scale economies that are available through the avoidance of duplicate 
information collection.  
 
The analogy between analysts gathering information on behalf of their clients and banks 
providing delegated monitoring à la Diamond (1984) raises the question of how a system 
involving analysts deals with the incentive problems arising from delegation. In Diamond 
(1984) this incentive problem is solved by having the bank provide financial 
intermediation as well as monitoring services, with debt finance of the bank ensuring that 
there is no incentive to misreport monitoring results or to underinvest in monitoring effort. 
In contrast, there is no such arrangement for stock market analysts. Given this lacuna, we 
should expect to see precisely what we saw in the late nineties, namely analysts not doing 
24 
their homework or, worse, issuing reports that were at odds with the information they 
actually had if this served their other interests.  
 
Adherents to the doctrine of market discipline would probably interject that analysts and 
accountants as well as investment bankers have their reputations to take care of, so proper 
incentives are being provided by the fact that they want to be successful in the future as 
well as the present. The argument presumes that the people concerned attach a lot of 
weight to the future relative to the present and, moreover, that stakes in the present are 
sufficiently small so that misbehaviour does not pay very much. On both accounts, I am 
sceptical. If current misbehaviour provides opportunities for earning a few million dollars, 
one may not care very much about losing one’s business thereafter, provided one expects 
to keep the ill-gotten gains. We must also keep in mind that detection of misbehaviour 
may be quite difficult. After all, the investments in question are risky, so the mere fact that 
things have turned sour does not provide evidence that the advice had been bad, let alone 
fraudulent. In this context we may point to the results of empirical research on investment 
funds that indicates that a fund’s ability to acquire new clients is most influenced by return 
realizations in the immediate past; the fact that high return realizations may reflect risk-
taking rather than competence does not seem to be treated as a cause for concern; where 
such neglect may lead is shown by the unhappy fate of LTCM. 
 
Another observation to be studied concerns the nature and governance of executive 
compensation schemes that were introduced. As mentioned before, these schemes had 
little to do with the incentive schemes studied in theoretical models (Bebchuk and Fried 
2004): First, they provided remuneration for positive returns that had nothing to do with 
managerial behaviour – and could be recognized as such. Second, these schemes provided 
ample scope for mishandling the allocation of effort across different dimensions, e.g., 
through cutting clearly measurable costs today at the expense of unmeasurable, but 
nonetheless real prospects for tomorrow. To the extent that the effects of cost cutting were 
presented in terms of profit growth effects rather than level effects, the resulting incentive 
distortion was even larger. Third, these schemes provided significant management 
participation in upside risks, but, given the scope for the timing of the exercise of options, 
they provided little participation in downside risks. 
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As for the governance of these schemes, they had of course been introduced on the 
initiative of incumbent management itself, and they ended up providing a source of 
significant enrichment. Transparency about the costs of these schemes to the companies in 
question was impeded by inappropriate accounting rules, maintained by the U.S. Congress 
at the insistence of managerial lobbies. To the extent that incumbent managements were  
able to manipulate profit reports and to influence accountants, investment bankers, and 
analysts, incentive schemes may actually have generated more effort to influence stock 
prices through these channels than through an improvement in actual business activities. 
 
In earlier work (Hellwig 2000, 2001), I had questioned the relevance of the traditional 
paradigm for studying corporate governance mainly as a matter of contractual relations 
and of institutions providing final investors with sufficient information and control to 
make it worth their while to provide companies with money. Given the empirical 
observation that corporate management in market-oriented and in bank-dominated 
systems alike enjoy a significant degree of autonomy, I had suggested that the mentioned 
similarity in governance structures across systems might be more important than the 
apparent differences. For bank-dominated systems, I pointed to the fact that, in a system 
where managements of large corporations are by and large autonomous, being subject to 
little outside control, there is no reason to expect banks to act as “delegated monitors” on 
behalf of final investors rather than as defendants of managerial interests, hoping to 
participate in the spoils by providing investment banking services at a time when 
corporate executives with cash cows in their back yards were looking for mergers and 
acquisitions. At the time, I formulated this argument as a comment on the role of main 
banks in a bank-dominated system. The experience of the nineties suggests that the very 
same argument is relevant for understanding the role of market institutions, accountants, 
analysts, and investment bankers, in a market-oriented system. This suspicion could make 
us pause and question our thinking about market discipline. Perhaps the market – just like 
any other institution – is just an instrument which corporate managers can use when it 
suits their purposes, as it so obviously did in the second half of the nineties. It certainly 
did not provide much discipline in that period. 
 
However, we should recognize that the malfunctioning of institutions of the financial 
system that we have seen corresponds to what we should expect under financing structures 
involving significant elements of equity-like finance and the securitization of risks: Thus,  
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a defined-contributions pension plan is subject to the standard agency problem of share 
finance; namely, the final investor bears the consequences of the fund managers’ action. 
So in a trade-off between what contract theorists euphemistically call “private benefits”, 
and the interests of the fund, the fund managers may have a tendency to pursue their own 
private benefits rather than the interests of the funds and its investors.  
 
The increased incidence of this class of agency problems is a direct consequence of the 
move towards more equity finance and more securitized financial arrangements. Finding 
mechanisms for keeping these problems under control is essential to the viability of such 
arrangements in the future. However, we must keep in mind that although a system of 
supervision may seem foolproof by the standards of the day, if the stakes are high enough 
people will look for ways to get around them; and if enough people do so, they will find 
such ways. From this perspective, the instances of malfunctioning and malfeasance that 
we have seen should not have come as a surprise. Given the way the system evolved, they 
were bound to come. Moreover, if we think about modes of correction only in terms of the 
particular kinds of fraud and corruption that we have seen, the next round of problems is 
bound to come. We need to think about the problem as being endemic to a system in 
which the final investor foots the bill.  
 
V. Concluding Remark 
 
The analysis of this paper indicates that “market discipline” is no more a panacea for the 
problems of information, incentives, and control in finance than the “main bank relation”. 
Different arrangements have different advantages and disadvantages in terms of how they 
align incentives between entrepreneurs and managers, financial institutions, and final 
investors. The experience of the past decade has shown the pitfalls of excessive 
confidence in a poorly regulated regime of “market discipline”, just as the experience of 
the years 1980–1995 taught about the pitfalls of excessive intermediated loan finance 
inducing the risk of a credit crunch or a banking crisis. Examining these episodes in 
parallel provides a wholesome warning against excessive enthusiasm about either 
“system”. However, as one thinks about the implications to be drawn, one should also 
bear in mind that in the actual developments in the nineties, the rise of market rhetoric – in 
academic as well as political discussion – seems to have merely provided the background 
for a development that was driven more by the people and institutions whom market 
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discipline was supposed to be controlling than by the people and institutions for whom 
such control was supposed to be beneficial.  
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